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Introduction 
A quick scan of education news coverage points to a revival of interest in school-based 
decisionmaking. Districts in Chicago and New York have devolved authority to some schools, 
and what started as a pilot program decentralizing authority in Boston has grown steadily. 
Houston also has decentralized some level of authority to all schools and Massachusetts recently 
granted increased autonomy to some of its lowest performing schools. At the time of writing, 
proposals afoot in Connecticut, South Carolina, and Nevada would enable more school-based 
resource decisions. And to many, the growth of charter schools looks like another example of the 
movement toward freeing schools from central office rules and moving decisions down to the 
building level.  
Devolving authority to schools reflects the notion that school personnel are better equipped 
than district administrators to make efficient and effective use of their resources to meet student 
needs. As state and federal reforms move accountability for student performance to the school 
level, some policymakers have suggested that new accountability should be accompanied by 
more school-based authority. When building leaders are able to make decisions, the reasoning 
goes, those decisions can be tailored to the unique needs of their students, thereby resulting in 
more efficient and effective use of resources (Goertz and Stiefel 1998) 1.  
But decentralization was tried before, in the 1980s, without much effect. Analysts suggest 
that the earlier efforts had limited results in part because decisions about resources (budgets, 
personnel, and staffing) were retained under central management (Bimber 1994; Hansen and 
Roza 2005). Lack of authority over these critical matters inherently limited the decisions school 
leaders could make, according to these analysts. 
Conditions today may be more sympathetic to deeper, thoroughgoing decentralization than 
they were a generation ago. The development of the standards-based reform movement, the 
creation of new federal and state accountability systems, and changes in finance formulas at the 
federal, state, and local levels all create a new context for decentralization. In particular, school-
based funding formulas in place of district-based allocations allow education leaders to think 
differently about how resource decisions are made at the school level. The federal Title I 
program allows for whole-school funding. Some districts use or are considering weighted budget 
allocation policies that focus on student and school needs, rather than allocating funds according 
to district-determined formulas. Given this new policy context, it makes sense that policymakers 
are again considering reforms that would devolve decisions to schools. Of key interest this time 
are policies that would provide schools greater autonomy over key resource decisions. 
For policymakers, several questions remain: If school leaders had more autonomy over 
resource decisions, would that result in any real difference in how schools use resources? When 
                                                
1 Recent research on decentralization, accompanied by greater school control over resources, provides some 
evidence of a positive effect on student performance. A 1996 study of schools in Texas concluded that principals 
who carefully and steadily applied resources to interrelated organizational changes could bring about gains in 
achievement (Murnane and Levy 1996). A study of Chicago’s decentralization effort in the 1990s found that 
principals were able to inventively deploy resources in ways that appeared to boost achievement (Bryk, Camburn, 
and Louis 1999). A study of Boston’s Pilot School Program found pilot students (in schools with greater authority 
over budget, curriculum, staffing, and governance) performed better than students in other Boston public schools 
(Tung, Ouimette, and Feldman 2004). 
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provided with greater spending autonomy, what kinds of choices do school leaders make? Are 
those choices meaningfully different from current practice? What kinds of constraints continue to 
serve as barriers to change?  
Answers to such questions could help policymakers design more effective school autonomy 
policies. While policymakers will ultimately want to know how autonomy relates to student 
achievement, what is needed today is some idea of what school leaders would do if given 
freedom from spending restrictions. 
Research Literature  
The theory of action at play in proposals to decentralize decisionmaking and provide greater 
autonomy at the school level is that when building leaders have control over their resources, they 
use them differently and are able to improve student performance. Findings thus far about 
student performance are mixed, at best, but as some analysts have claimed, almost none of the 
early decentralization initiatives gave school-level leaders control over money and staff. 
Researchers have found that without control over resources, the likelihood that decentralized 
decisionmaking will lead to improved student performance is inherently limited (Steifel et al. 
2003; Olson 1997). Bimber (1994) identified specific policy decisions that remained centralized, 
including: (1) salaries and benefits; (2) size of the teaching staff; (3) allocation of personnel to 
responsibilities/positions; and (4) selection of teachers.  
In a study designed to determine the amount of flexibility that principals preferred when 
implementing site-based budgeting, Clover et al. (2004) found that principals themselves also 
identified district rules on how resources can be used as a barrier to change. Principals wanted a 
higher level of flexibility with their spending, particularly in the area of employee salaries and 
benefits—the area in which they had the least flexibility at the school level. 
This time around, decentralization efforts differ, with some devolving more authority over 
resource decisions than others. Yet with these new initiatives, analysts are interested in the 
intermediate step—in what ways do building leaders use resources differently when constraints 
are lifted? Here the literature provides some insights. 
Goertz and Steifel (1998), in their study of decentralization in four districts, found that 
building leaders used flexible resources in very traditional ways—reducing class size, expanding 
pre-school, and purchasing professional development and materials for new curriculum—and 
that no new innovations emerged. A General Accounting Office report (1994) on site-based 
management in three districts reported that school leaders chose to use their flexibility to add 
full-day kindergarten, extended-day programs, special education and gifted/talented programs, 
and new courses. Changes in budgeting included adjustments to spending on staff, supplies, and 
equipment. Another study found that increasing the share of flexible resources resulted in 
structural changes, for example offering reading programs within high schools (Carnoy, Elmore, 
and Siskin 2003). 
Interestingly, some research on entrepreneurial, “risk-taking,” or even “rebel” principals 
suggests that district rules on spending need not serve as real barriers to building-based 
decisions. Anecdotal reports of building leaders characterized as “non-conformist,” “independent 
thinkers,” or “creative bureaucrats” often accompany stories of unlikely changes made at schools 
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(even those that seem to defy real barriers) in spite of the centralized system (Williams 2006). 
Some reports suggest that these entrepreneurial principals are able to pull together their staff in 
more creative ways to serve their students. Despite the anecdotal nature of the evidence, it does 
raise the notion that when push comes to shove, some constraints need not restrict building 
leaders from doing what they want. 
New research on charter and private schools provides more insight into how resources get 
used when outside rules on spending are reduced. A study by the American Federation of 
Teachers on resource allocation in charter schools found that charters employ less experienced 
teachers. They also spend a smaller portion of their funds on instruction and a greater share on 
administration. A study comparing Edison schools to their local public schools found similar 
patterns, but noted that the lower salaries Edison pays allowed for more teachers per pupil than 
their counterparts even though instructional costs were lower. This study noted too that Edison 
schools had a complicated staffing structure where different staff members played multiple roles 
(Hannaway and Sharkey 2004). 
Data from the NCES Schools and Staffing Survey support this evidence of salary 
differentials between traditional public, charter, and private schools. Salaries are over 40% 
higher at traditional public schools than at private schools with charter schools falling 
somewhere in between.2 This could be driven in part by higher experience levels and greater 
proportions of teachers with higher levels of education at traditional public schools. 3  
Recent reports on teacher compensation (Kowal, Hassel, and Hassel 2007) show that charter 
and private schools make greater use of pay innovations and that strict salary schedules play a 
smaller role in determining base pay. Charter schools and private schools are more likely to use 
higher pay to fill hard-to-staff positions, and to make use of non-financial rewards to draw in the 
best teachers. 
While information about private schools’ resource use has been available for some time, 
some have questioned its applicability to public schools given the parochial nature of many 
private schools, which may lead to differences in objectives and student populations. For 
instance, reports of lower teacher salaries have been accompanied by proposed explanations that 
teachers are willing to work for less in private schools to support their religious missions or 
because of fewer student problems. 
So, while the literature provides some evidence that schools with greater autonomy may 
indeed use their resources differently, policymakers are far from having the answers they need to 
design more effective school autonomy policies. Ultimately, policymakers will want to know 
how autonomy relates to student achievement, but what is still needed today is some idea of what 
schools would do if given freedom from specific spending restrictions. 
 
 
                                                
2 Average annual salaries for full time teachers were $44,500, $37,000, and $31,700 for traditional public, 
charter, and private schools, respectively, for the 2003-2004 school year.  
3 The percentages of teachers with more than 4 years of full time teaching experience are 82.5%, 56.6%, and 
68.3% and the percentages of teachers with master’s degrees or higher are 48.3%, 32.6%, and 35.3% for traditional 
public, charter, and private schools, respectively.  
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Research Design 
In this paper, we ask how school flexibility and autonomy are related to how schools spend 
their funds, determine trade-offs among competing demands for resources, and make decisions 
about what proportion of their resources should be devoted to staffing. In order to investigate 
differences in resource use by school type, this study utilizes resource data from different types 
of schools, differentiated by the degree of autonomy school leaders have over resource use.  
Ohio served as a suitable study site in large part because of our access to publicly available 
finance data on district and charter elementary schools. The database includes school allocations, 
staffing patterns, and salaries for all public and charter elementary schools in the state and 
provides data for the 2004-05 school year. In addition to the availability of the database, Ohio 
provided a rich setting for this study because it has multiple mid-sized city districts, each of 
which includes charter and private schools, allowing for comparisons among different school 
types in the same labor markets. Further, one of the city districts—Cincinnati—is one of the 
early-decentralized reform districts where schools were given some resource autonomy 
beginning in the 1999-2000 school year. Selecting all public and charter elementary schools in 
Ohio’s eight largest districts (Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, 
and Youngstown) produced a count of some 449 publicly funded schools, including:  
 311 regular public schools in traditional centralized districts; 
 57 regular public schools in one decentralized district (Cincinnati); and 
 81 charter schools in the eight cities.  
Since we were also interested in understanding whether resource allocation patterns differed 
under “entrepreneurial” school leaders in centralized school systems, we sought out nominations 
of particularly entrepreneurial principals from state and district officials. These principals were 
identified as “doing things differently despite their centralized district setting.” Of the 311 
schools in centralized districts, nine were classified as schools led by entrepreneurial leaders. 
To get similar data for private schools, we surveyed 196 private schools (85% were 
parochial) in the same eight cities and 68 completed surveys reflecting 2005-2006 school year 
data.  
Added to the 449 public schools, the 68 responding private schools provided the project with 
more than 500 elementary schools which we placed in this five-way classification:  
 Schools in centralized districts (302 schools).  
 Schools in centralized districts with “entrepreneurial” principals (9 schools). 
 Schools in a decentralized district (57 schools). 
 Charter schools (81 schools).  
 Private schools (68 schools). 
The five types of schools differ in the amount of autonomy they enjoy in allocating various 
school-level resources identified in the literature, as indicated in table 1.  
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Table 1. School-Level Resource Autonomies Differ Among School Types 
 
Key Areas of School-Level Resource Autonomy 
School Types 
 
 
 Control over 
allocation of 
personnel to 
responsibilities 
Control over 
allocation of 
resources across 
functional categories 
(e.g., pupil support, 
administration, etc.) 
Control over 
number of 
teachers 
Control over 
teacher 
compensation 
Schools in centralized 
districts     
Schools in centralized 
districts with 
“entrepreneurial” principals  
    
Schools in decentralized 
districts     
Charter schools     
Private schools     
 
To investigate differences in spending and staffing decisions, the project assembled 
enrollment, staffing and expenditure data for each of the following, by school:  
 Non-categorical expenditures broken out by function (administrative, building 
operations, instructional, pupil support, and staff support). 
 Student enrollment. 
 Average teacher salary. 
 Number of full time equivalents (FTE) in each of 39 publicly defined job titles. 
Unfortunately, in piloting the private school survey, it became apparent that respondents 
could not reliably separate costs by function (that is to say by administration, building 
operations, pupil support, and instructional and staff support). The final survey, therefore, did not 
seek this information and the findings below do not provide any estimates for private schools 
across functional categories. (Appendix A provides the brief questionnaire to which the private 
schools responded.) 
Findings 
Based on these data, what can be said about how expenditure decisions differ across the five 
categories of schools (regular public, decentralized public, entrepreneurial leadership, charter, 
and private)? Do schools with different levels of autonomy make different trade-offs in staff 
hiring and responsibilities? Between teachers’ salary levels and the number of fulltime 
equivalents (i.e., between paying higher salaries and employing fewer people, or paying lower 
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salaries and having more adults in the classroom)? Do higher salaries drive higher instructional 
costs and higher costs per pupil? 
This section of the paper reports our findings in each of these areas. 
Resource Allocation Across Functional Categories Differs in District and Charter 
Schools, Although it is Not Clear How These Differences Relate to Autonomy 
Recall that the survey provides no information about resource distribution across functional 
categories for private schools. Therefore, looking at schools in the remaining categories, it is 
apparent from the analysis of the public database that there are differences among school types in 
their distribution of resource costs across functional categories (see figures 1a and 1b).  
These figures represent expenditures as a percentage just of school budgets (which represent 
a only a portion of expenditures on behalf of district schools), so one should be careful in 
jumping to conclusions about the results. As the figure 1a indicates, charters spend less than half 
of total expenditures on instruction and instructional support, while each of the public school 
types exceeds 60 percent in the share of expenditures devoted to instruction. The proportion of 
charter expenditures devoted to administrative support is also about six times the proportion of 
each of the other public school categories, while each of the public school types outspends 
charters on staff support (e.g., professional development and training). 
In many ways the broader pattern described above is unremarkable. Regular public schools, 
no matter how centralized or decentralized, receive a lot of administrative support from district 
expenditures, which are not considered in this analysis. Somebody has to keep the books, raise 
funds, pay teachers, recruit them, and report to the public. In the absence of a district structure to 
handle these responsibilities, the onus falls on charter leaders. (And a similar onus probably falls 
on private school leaders.) As a proportion of outlays, therefore, administrative support eats up a 
larger share of school-level expenditures, simply because administration is supported at the 
school level in charter schools and at the district level in regular public schools. As the 
proportion of budgets devoted to administration goes up in charter schools, the proportion 
devoted to all other areas declines. 
It is not clear that the differences are significant—or related to autonomy. District 
decentralized schools spend slightly more on instruction and instructional support than 
centralized schools, but the difference (1.5%) is relatively small. It is something of a surprise to 
see entrepreneurial schools spending a lower proportion of school budgets on instruction than 
their regular public school peers, but the number of schools reported here is so small (nine), that 
the results are at best indicative and call for further research. 
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Figures 1a and 1b. Proportionate Expenditures Differ by Function Across School 
Types  
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Schools With More Autonomy Have More Teachers Per Pupil  
Examination of staff patterns among school types suggests both trade-offs between 
classroom teachers and other positions, and among the types of other positions. Figure 2 provides 
the data on staffing patterns among the different school types. What is most significant is that 
private schools, charter schools, decentralized schools, and schools led by entrepreneurs all hired 
more teachers per 300 students than regular centralized public schools. That is to say, schools 
with greater hiring flexibility tend to use it to hire classroom teachers. Everything else being 
equal, this should translate directly into smaller class sizes. Further, schools with even more 
autonomy (charters and privates) had even more teachers than schools with less (decentralized 
schools). 
 
Figure 2. Schools With Fewer Constraints Have More Teachers Per 300 Students  
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Schools With More Autonomy Use Fewer Non-Teaching Professionals  
The patterns for “other professionals” represent the opposite trend in that schools with 
greater autonomy opted for fewer non-teaching professionals (such as librarians, counselors, 
nurses and other professionals). As figure 2 suggests, there is almost a direct trade-off between 
teachers and other professionals: private and charter schools had more teachers at the expense of 
other professionals whereas schools in centralized districts and schools with entrepreneurial 
principals used their resources to purchase a greater number of other professionals at the expense 
of some teachers. Interestingly enough, the nine entrepreneurial principals hire the largest 
number of “other professionals.” These “other professionals” account for seven FTE slots in 
entrepreneurial schools. 
Private Schools Have (By Far) More Administrative Staff Per Student Than Any of 
Their Public School Brethren, Including Charter Schools  
Private schools (that is to say primarily parochial schools) clearly hire more administrative 
FTEs. One might anticipate the administrative hires, given the lack of a central office to support 
administration, but one would also expect to see the pattern in figure 1a, in which charter schools 
spent a larger share of their budgets on administration, repeated here in figure 2. Charter schools, 
lacking a central district to support administration, should look more like private schools than 
public schools in figure 2. But the reverse is true. 
Schools of Different Types Make Different Trade-Offs Between Teacher Salaries and 
FTEs  
In public schools, whether centralized or decentralized, teacher salaries are on fixed 
schedules; they cannot be varied at the school level. For charter and private schools, salaries are 
included among resource decisions that school administrators can make. Figure 3 demonstrates 
the trade-offs that charter and private school officials make between salaries and number of 
positions.  
Charter and private school leaders seem to opt for lower salaries and more staff, while the 
opposite pattern evident in centralized and decentralized schools. While there are fewer teachers 
per pupil for public centralized schools, salaries are higher at public schools than at charter or 
private schools. Across the board in public schools, whether centralized, decentralized, or 
entrepreneurial, teachers receive higher pay than they do in either private schools or charter 
schools. In the schools we studied, where there are higher salaries, there are fewer teachers per 
pupil. Teacher salaries in the centralized schools averaged $53,970; private and charter teachers 
averaged salaries more than $20,000 less, with private school teachers at $29,910 and charter 
teachers at $31,350. Meanwhile, the public decentralized category averaged the highest salaries 
at $56,911, but this set represents just the 57 schools in Cincinnati. Conceivably, the small 
sample, or district-specific factors (such as higher cost of living, union negotiations, or other 
district characteristics) drive this average up beyond that of other districts. 
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Teacher pay is, on average, $5,050 per teacher lower at the nine schools identified as being 
led by entrepreneurial principals than their centralized counterparts from the same districts. This 
finding suggests that these entrepreneurial principals have a smaller share of more senior (and 
more highly paid) teachers. What is not self-evident is whether the principals chose these 
teachers, or senior and mid-career teachers self-selected away from these schools. 
 
Figure 3. School Types Make Different Trade-Offs Between Teacher Salaries and 
Number of Classroom FTEs Per Pupil 
How is it that charter and private schools can recruit teachers at such lower cost? Clearly this 
study didn’t directly address this question, yet the data do lend themselves to hypotheses about 
the link between class size and teacher salary. Or, as has been supported by the literature, it may 
be that charter and private schools recruit teachers at lower cost by relying on younger and less-
expensive teachers.  
Higher Salaries in Schools With Constraints on Teacher Compensation Drive Higher 
Classroom Teacher Costs Per Pupil  
While public centralized and decentralized schools have fewer teachers per pupil, the higher 
salaries drive up costs beyond what’s caused by FTEs (see figure 4). Since classroom teacher 
salaries comprise the bulk of instructional expenditures, it makes sense that centralized schools 
spend more per pupil on instruction ($2,361 per pupil) than do charters ($1,970) or private 
school ($1,683). A note of caution when interpreting the high per-pupil cost associated with the 
public decentralized schools ($3,062), all schools in our sample come from the same district, and 
thus the higher salaries in this set may indeed be a function of higher cost of living, union 
negotiations, or other district specific characteristics, which then create the highest classroom 
teacher costs per pupil. 
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Figure 4. Higher Salaries Drive Higher Classroom and Instructional Costs Per 
Pupil 
Centralized Schools Use Fewer Partial FTEs 
The pilot survey of private schools revealed that some schools use individuals in multiple 
roles (for example, a vice principal who also teaches algebra.). To further investigate how 
staffing patterns differ among schools with different constraints, the final analysis examined the 
use of “partial FTEs” to fill different roles. Figure 5 provides the results.  
The results are quite striking. It seems apparent that private schools and the 57 decentralized 
schools in Cincinnati use “partial FTEs” in various roles at rates three to four times higher than 
charter, entrepreneurial, or centralized schools. The differences could not be more apparent. This 
seems to be a case in which the hiring and spending autonomy afforded to school leaders in 
private and decentralized schools is used to obtain maximum flexibility in the use of human 
resources.  
One would expect that charter schools would look more like private and decentralized 
schools on this dimension, but they do not. The rates of “partial FTE” use for charter schools are 
only slightly higher than the rates from centralized school principals. And while the difference 
may have something to do with the fact that charter schools are still relatively new, it isn’t clear 
how or why that works. This finding is difficult to explain and deserves further research.  
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Figure 5. Some School Types Are More Likely to Use at Least One Partial FTE in a 
Higher Percentage of Job Categories Than Others 
Implications and Conclusions 
The findings here shed light on how levels of control over resources influences resource 
allocation patterns. As noted at the outset, different kinds of schools possess autonomy with 
respect to how they utilize various resources. At the least autonomous end of the spectrum, 
centralized schools are restricted from the four kinds of relevant freedoms identified in the 
literature (allocating personnel to responsibilities, allocating resources across functional 
categories, the number of teachers employed, and teacher compensation). By contrast: 
 Schools with entrepreneurial principals enjoy autonomy only over the first 
category (allocating personnel to responsibilities). 
 Schools in decentralized districts enjoy that freedom, plus the autonomy of 
allocating resources across functional categories and determining the number of 
teachers employed. 
 Charters and private schools can take advantage of all four categories of resource 
flexibility, including teacher compensation. 
Table 2 incorporates these findings with the research literature to demonstrate how findings 
from this study could be used to predict the relationship between different levels of school-based 
autonomy over resources and allocation patterns. Of particular relevance is the tendency to try to 
employ more teachers per pupil and the trade-offs that schools with teacher salary freedoms 
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make between salary and FTEs. Restrictions on teacher salaries, then, serve as a formidable 
barrier to some of the resource allocation changes schools might pursue. Schools in decentralized 
districts typically lack freedom over salaries, which will certainly constrain the scope of their 
other freedoms.  
Table 2. Types of Autonomy and Resource Allocation Patterns 
Minimal Constraints On:   Is Associated With: 
Allocation of personnel to 
responsibilities  
Smaller increments of staff (partial FTEs), however this 
is difficult to determine with available data  
Allocation of resources across 
functional categories (e.g., pupil 
support, administration, etc.)  
 More classroom teachers at the expense of specialists 
Number of teachers  
More teachers, as is fiscally feasible (constraints on 
salaries will prevent the school from making trade-offs 
between salary and FTEs) 
Teacher compensation   Lower, more differentiated salaries 
 
In this study, schools with flexibility in staffing among functional categories chose hiring 
more teachers and fewer specialists. Evidence on changes resulting from freedoms around 
personnel responsibilities, however, was more difficult to identify in this data. 
Implications for “entrepreneurial principals.” The question naturally arises: what could 
policymakers expect if resource decisions were devolved to the school level, accompanied by 
greater autonomy for entrepreneurial principals to vary how these resources are employed along 
the four dimensions outlined in table 1?  
While schools with entrepreneurial principals were described as ones that were doing things 
differently than other district schools, their staffing and expenditure data did not, in fact, look 
greatly different from public centralized schools. These schools did have more staff (of all kinds) 
than other schools in the same districts, as well as teachers paid at the lower end of the salary 
schedule. Given the data limitations, however, it is difficult to draw conclusions from these 
findings, except to note that the barriers imposed on schools in centralized districts are real, and 
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that even with entrepreneurial principals, policymakers should not expect substantial differences 
in resource allocation patterns without more explicit autonomy for spending decisions at the 
school level.  
Implications for more autonomous schools. What, on the other hand, would happen if 
individual schools were freed from existing constraints on resource allocation? 
Identifying innovations or efficiencies from resource data alone is difficult, yet the patterns 
prevalent in schools with fewer resource constraints may point to more efficient decisions. First, 
schools without constraints on teacher salaries operated with lower salaries and higher ratios of 
teachers to pupils, suggesting that they were able to structure their compensation systems to get 
more for their salary dollar.  
It should be noted that this study was not able to consider differences in teacher quality, 
which would be important in any full analysis of efficiency. It is possible that schools with fewer 
constraints (or fewer resources) use fewer specialists and more teachers, which might suggest 
greater academic focus. However, without definitive answers on the most efficient mix of 
resources for students, it is impossible to know if such approaches yield better results for 
students.  
Finally, schools with fewer constraints used more partial FTEs to cover different jobs, 
indicating a more tailored approach to using local capacity to address school needs. For example, 
one private school principal in our data set described her school staffing in the following way: 
We have a very confusing schedule, but it fits our needs and allows us to get the 
most from our staff. Most of the K-8 grades have one full-time teacher each. The 
fourth grade teacher does two periods of counseling a day. These two periods are 
covered by the ESL and Spanish teacher. Fifth grade is split between two full-time 
staff members, but each spends half time as the grade-level teacher. The other 
half of their time is spent as a half-time librarian and computer education 
instructor (respectively). Seventh grade is covered by a teacher part of the day; 
the other part of her day is spent teaching physical education to all grades. When 
this teacher is teaching P.E., the seventh grade class is covered by a part-time 
teacher. This part-time teacher teaches 3 classes/day of social studies and then 
she teaches music (two periods/week) and art for 3 periods/week. There is 
another part-time music teacher who comes in two days/week.  
Implications for traditional fiscal indicators. As was apparent in the literature review, 
other studies limited to the use of publicly available data focus on expenditures per functional 
category (instruction, administration and the like). As this study indicates, however, since the 
total salaries per teacher are lower in schools without constraints on salaries, total expenditures 
in the functional category of instruction depend heavily on the salaries the school pays. 
Comparisons of expenditures in each functional category, then, ignore differences in purchasing 
power and mask potentially substantial differences in purchased resources. Studies of resource 
comparisons across schools with different constraints on salaries, therefore, should take care to 
go beyond the traditional indicators of spending on functional categories. Traditional fiscal 
indicators need to be improved or they will continue to mask differences in purchasing power 
across schools facing different constraints on their autonomy. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
The first conclusion to be drawn is that constraints on school autonomy matter. The current 
interest in decentralization offers a new opportunity for exploring the proposition that real 
improvement in student learning can be achieved within the public school system by radically 
altering the locus of decisionmaking and shifting authority over key decisions to the school level.  
Certainly, the conditions and context are different now than in the 1980s, with standards, 
accountability, and new funding formulas promising to give new operational possibilities to 
school-based autonomy. That said, it is important to emphasize that most current decentralization 
efforts have not yet created all the conditions necessary for fully decentralizing control of 
resources. As this study indicates, some important constraints on resources remain, including the 
capacity to set and control teacher compensation. 
The second conclusion is that more research on this entire range of questions is necessary. 
The findings reported here are indicative and suggestive, but not definitive. They may apply in 
Ohio, but not elsewhere. The implications for secondary schools are completely unknown. And it 
may well be the case that the results reported here would differ in significant ways if a larger 
proportion of private schools had responded to the questionnaire, if the questionnaire had been 
more detailed, and if the study had had access to private school budgetary information as detailed 
as the information available on Ohio’s public elementary schools. 
Beyond that, of course, additional research is warranted to rule out the possibility that the 
behavior of private and charter schools was driven not by decisionmaking autonomy, but by 
constraints under which they operate or by their efforts to manage budgetary uncertainty.  
This study provides insight into resource allocation patterns in elementary schools in one 
state and how these patterns differ depending, in part, on how control over resources is 
decentralized to schools. Clearly there are also non-fiscal constraints (hiring and firing of 
teachers, for example) that may interact with other constraints to affect the ultimate decisions 
that schools make with school-based decisionmaking. But for district leaders, an outcome that 
seems certain is that the changes schools make depend, in part, on the autonomy they are granted 
and on the remaining constraints with which they must contend. 
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Appendix A. Private School Survey 
 
SCHOOL RESOURCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
For question number 1, we ask for an estimate of the full time equivalent (FTE) count 
of the staff members in your school. Every staff member that is a full time employee 
would count as 1.0 FTE. A staff member that works less than full time would be 
represented in decimal format (e.g., a teacher that works two days a week would be 
considered 0.4 FTE). 
If you have no staff in any category, please place a zero in the box. 
         
1. Based on your staff from the previous school year, please estimate your 
SCHOOL’S FTE COUNT in each of the following categories: 
         
POSITION  FTE    
         
Principal      .      
         
Assistant Principal      .      
         
Classroom Teacher      .      
         
Other Teacher (art, music, P.E., etc.)      .      
         
Administrative Assistant      .      
         
Librarian / Media Specialist      .      
         
Registered Nurse      .      
         
Tutor / Small Group Instructor      .      
         
Counselor      .      
         
Custodian      .      
         
Teacher's Aide      .      
         
Occupational Therapist      .      
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Appendix A (cont’d). Private School Survey 
         
Physical Therapist      .      
         
Education Services Teacher      .      
         
Permanent Substitute Teacher      .      
         
Psychologist      .      
         
Teacher Mentor / Evaluator      .      
         
Remedial Specialist      .      
         
Social Worker      .      
         
Special Education Teacher      .      
         
Speech / Language Therapist      .      
         
Other Administrative Staff      .      
         
Other Educational Professional      .      
         
Other Service Worker      .      
         
Other _____________________      .      
         
         
2. What was the AVERAGE TEACHER SALARY of the instructional staff at your 
school last year? Please use data from the previous school year and round to the 
nearest dollar. 
         
Average Teacher Salary $     ,        
         
3. What was the approximate STUDENT ENROLLMENT at your school last year?  
         
Student Enrollment            
         
THIS IS THE END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
         
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
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 Appendix B. Descriptive Data  
Variable Private Charter Public - Decentralized 
Public - 
Entrepreneurial 
Public - 
Centralized 
Number of schools 68 81 57 9 311 
Total student enrollment 270 279 409 407 365 
Average teacher salary $29,910 $31,350 $56,911 $48,920 $53,970 
Administrative 
expenditures as % of total  - 30% 6% 5% 6% 
Building operations 
expenditure as % of total - 17% 16% 17% 16% 
Instructional expenditures 
as % of total - 47% 65% 61% 64% 
Pupil support 
expenditures as % of total - 3% 5% 13% 10% 
Staff support 
expenditures as % of total - 3% 8% 4% 5% 
Partial FTE % 43% 12% 35% 9% 8% 
Classroom teachers per 
pupil x average teacher 
salary 
$1,683 $1,970 $3,062 $2,316 $2,361 
Classroom teachers per 
300 pupils 16.8 18.6 16.2 14.3 13.2 
Other teachers per 300 
pupils 2.8 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.8 
Teaching Aides per 300 
pupils 3.4 1.3 0.5 1.5 1.5 
Special Education FTE 
per 300 pupils 0.7 1.2 2.3 5.3 3.2 
Admin FTE per 300 
pupils 3.8 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 
Ed Professional FTE per 
300 pupils 0.9 0.4 1.8 1.4 1.5 
Other Professional FTE 
per 300 pupils 1.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Service FTE per 300 
pupils 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
